The East-West Divide in German Politics

In virtually every major German election since 2017, the AfD's strongest performances have come from the five eastern federal states — Saxony, Thuringia, Brandenburg, Saxony-Anhalt, and Mecklenburg-Vorpommern. In some eastern constituencies, the AfD regularly wins first place outright. Understanding why requires looking beyond simple political analysis into history, economics, and collective identity.

The Legacy of Reunification

Germany's 1990 reunification was politically triumphant but economically turbulent for the East. The rapid transition from a planned economy to a market economy led to mass unemployment as state-owned enterprises collapsed. Entire industries disappeared within a few years. Millions of eastern Germans — particularly younger, educated workers — migrated westward in search of opportunities, hollowing out communities and leaving behind an older, more economically precarious population.

This process, sometimes called the Abwanderung (outmigration), had lasting demographic and psychological effects. Many eastern Germans developed a sense that reunification was effectively an absorption into the West rather than a genuine merger of equals — that their institutions, experiences, and identities were devalued.

Economic Indicators Still Lag the West

Despite decades of substantial transfer payments from west to east (estimated at over €2 trillion since 1990), economic gaps persist:

  • Average wages remain lower in eastern states than western equivalents
  • Productivity per worker is lower on average
  • Unemployment rates, while improved, have historically been higher
  • Wealth accumulation (property ownership, savings, pensions) is considerably lower due to the compressed post-reunification economic history

Political Culture and Trust Deficit

Eastern Germans grew up in a one-party state (the SED-led German Democratic Republic). This has produced a complex relationship with institutions, political parties, and mainstream media. Research consistently shows lower levels of trust in established political institutions among eastern Germans compared to their western counterparts — a legacy that benefits protest parties.

The AfD has explicitly positioned itself as the voice of the Wende generation's unresolved grievances — those who feel the democratic transition promised more than it delivered. The party's slogan framing of "we are the people" (Wir sind das Volk) — deliberately echoing the 1989 protest chants — resonates powerfully in this context.

Migration Concerns in Low-Migration Areas

Paradoxically, concerns about immigration tend to be strongest in regions with the lowest actual migrant populations — a pattern observed not just in Germany but across Europe. In many eastern German regions, personal exposure to immigration is relatively limited, but media coverage and political messaging have made it a central concern. The AfD has been highly effective at channelling this anxiety.

The AfD in State Governments — A Looming Question

The AfD's dominance in eastern Germany creates a structural problem for the Brandmauer policy. In Thuringia and Saxony, the AfD's vote shares have made it nearly impossible to form state-level coalitions without creative arithmetic. The BSW (Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance), a newer left-nationalist party, has partially filled this gap, but the long-term question of whether eastern state governments can indefinitely be formed while excluding the largest or second-largest party remains unresolved.

Conclusion

The AfD's eastern German strength is not an accident or an anomaly. It reflects decades of economic disappointment, a specific political culture shaped by GDR history, demographic fragility, and a sense of cultural marginalisation. Addressing these underlying factors — rather than simply opposing the AfD electorally — is the challenge mainstream parties have yet to convincingly meet.